



# MALAYSIAN REFORM INITIATIVE (MARI)

Networks of Government Reform

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## SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 14th General Election in 2018 saw Malaysia democratically change its government after six decades of independence. The political coalition and current ruling party of Pakatan Harapan has founded its administration on the principles of good governance and democracy that prioritizes social justice. Under the new government, there have been greater efforts in promoting accountability and transparency, freedom of expression and access to information, gender balance and equal representation at all levels of government, as well as an increased engagement between government and civil society, which allows inclusive participation in the nation-building process.

This study represents an attempt to map out the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in pushing for reforms across various sectors and assess inter-organizational cooperation in promoting this agenda. In January and February of 2019, 92 organizations and individuals active in pushing for issues relevant to Malaysian government reform were contacted and asked to complete a social network analysis survey. The survey asked participants to identify which civil society actors they had interacted, and a series of follow up questions about the trust, information exchange, and relative influence on government reform of each actor they named.

### General findings:

- Results of the study showed there are 519 relationships between the 125 actors included in the network. This makes for an overall network density of 0.06 percent—somewhat lower than could be expected for a network of this size.
- The most frequently mentioned issues of focus were Indigenous People and Minority Reform (IPMR) and Institutional Reform (IR). The issues of IMPR and Security (SCT) are moderately correlated, and Civil Service Reforms (CSR) and Labor Rights (LR) are moderately correlated, meaning these issue areas are statistically more likely to be prioritized together.
- Analysis of network centrality scores and complementary descriptive questions reveal that the most important and structurally powerful actors within the Malaysian government reform space include: Bersih 2.0, SUHAKAM, SUARAM, Bar Council Malaysia, COMANGO, Sisters in Islam, and IKRAM.
- There are no clear leading donors within the network. Many participants claimed to rely on “individual donations” and government grants.
- The Malaysian Government Reform network has a “core” group of 30 actors best positioned to collaborate. The remaining organizations can be described as “peripheral.”
- While overall mean scores for trust and information exchange among the organizations were quite high, mean scores for actual collaboration and reliance are noticeably lower—which suggests a network of positive affinity, but less actual tangible interaction and partnership.
- No significant obstacles to collaboration with other organizations were observed, save for a moderate concern that staffing and financial resources could hinder the ability to forge and maintain collaborations.

## SECTION 2. INTRODUCTION, OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

### 2.1 Introduction and Rationale

The 14th General Election in 2018 saw Malaysia democratically change its government after six decades of independence. Under the stewardship of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as returning Prime Minister, the government has moved to promote greater accountability and transparency, mainly by clamping down on corruption. The new government's first order of business was to launch a comprehensive investigation into the multi-billion dollar '1MDB' scandal involving former Prime Minister Najib Razak. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has been granted greater autonomy in pursuing high-level graft cases involving senior officials that were swept under the carpet by the previous Barisan Nasional administration.

In terms of the country's election system, allegations of widespread electoral fraud and gerrymandering in the build-up to previous general elections prompted the new government to work with BERSIH, a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) calling for free and fair elections, to implement electoral reforms. Since 2007, BERSIH has held four peaceful public demonstrations, popularly known as the "Yellow Shirts Rally," to demand for a complete revamp of the electoral system. BERSIH's work has not ended in the post-GE14 period as it has continued to observe recent by-elections and act as an overall check and balance to the Election Commission (EC).

Malaysia has also made inroads in pushing for gender balance and equal representation at all levels of government. Apart from the appointment of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) President Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail as Malaysia's first female Deputy Prime Minister, there has been a marked improvement in gender and youth representation at the ministerial level. Meanwhile, there have been efforts to increase engagement between government and civil society, which allows inclusive participation in the nation-building process. For instance, the public can now address their concerns or complaints about government institutions directly to the Committee for Institutional Reforms that was set up immediately after Pakatan Harapan came into power.

Apart from this, the appointment of more racially diverse public office bearers such as the Chief Justice and the Attorney General (AG) has been widely lauded for its inclusivity, while a proposal is also underway to reform the legal system by separating the AG's Chambers from the public prosecution office. At the same time, reforms in terms of freedom of expression and access to information have been carried out with far greater respect for critical journalism, less-biased broadcast media and reduced political censorship.

In its first nine months, the Pakatan Harapan coalition has founded its administration around the principles of good governance and democracy that prioritizes social justice. However, the flurry of initial reforms, announcements, prosecutions and policy changes following the general election have now died down, and the new government is faced with the more difficult decisions. For instance, it has yet to address larger reforms such as access to quality education, reform of government-linked companies (GLCs), civil service reforms, and reviews of oppressive laws. Other issues concerning human rights—such as the abolition of the death penalty, child marriage, and statelessness—also remain unaddressed. Hence,

there is still a lot of work to be done in pushing for holistic reforms that will enhance the livelihood of the Malaysian public, and this will require active participation at all levels of society.

The purpose of this project from the outset was to highlight the efforts of CSOs in Malaysia in pushing for reforms across various sectors. The previous Barisan Nasional administration had introduced a series of political, economic and security reforms during its six decades of rule. However, many of these proposed reforms ultimately lacked efficacy, while a number of other significant issues were left unaddressed. There was also a lack of engagement between CSOs and the previous government when it came to having these reforms articulated and debated openly.

Under the new Pakatan Harapan government, however, the reform agenda appears to have gained traction once again and allowed for previously dormant or seemingly controversial reforms to be revived. As such, this study represents an active attempt to map out the role of CSOs in pushing for reforms and to specifically assess inter-organizational cooperation in promoting this agenda. To that end, the study conducted a social network analysis to clearly identify the role(s) each actor plays, and to eliminate redundancies and contradictions in reform strategies going forward. Ultimately, it is hoped that the study would cultivate a sense of camaraderie and solidarity among the organizations and individuals involved. The study finalized a list of government reforms that were distilled into eight categories featured in the table below:

Table 1. List of Government reform sectors

<p><b>Security Reform (SR)</b>            Legislation Review            Detention Without Trial            Oversight on Security Apparatus            Maritime Border Patrol            Laws Against Marginalized Groups</p>	<p><b>Media Reform (MR)</b>            Investigative Journalism            Access to Information            Freedom of the Press            Freedom of Expression            Free from Propaganda Tool</p>
<p><b>Good Governance (GG)</b>            Accountability            Transparency            Check &amp; Balances Mechanisms            Zero Tolerance on Corruption-Integrity            Declaration of Assets            Investigate Criminal Breach of Trust Cases</p>	<p><b>Institutional Reform (IR)</b>            Separations of Power            Independence of Judiciary            Fair Appointments (to Key Government Positions)            Empowerment of Constitution &amp; Rukun Negara            Consultative Policy-Making            Free &amp; Fair Elections</p>
<p><b>Reform of GLCs (GLC)</b>            Independent Appointments            Answerable to Select Committee            Open Tender System</p>	<p><b>Civil Service Reforms (CSR)</b>            Promotion Based on Meritocracy            Reduced Bureaucracy            Improve Law Enforcement Agencies</p>

<p><b>Indigenous People &amp; Minorities Reform (IPMR)</b>  Access to Quality Education &amp; Basic Utilities  Equal Distribution of Wealth  Special Protection for Minorities  Inclusive National Identity &amp; Narrative  Freedom of Religious Practices  Representation in Parliament</p>	<p><b>Labor Rights (LR)</b>  Minimum Wage  Workers Union  Insurance For High Risk Jobs  Non-Discriminatory Employment</p>
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The reforms were specifically chosen and categorized as above because they were perceived to cover a spectrum of pressing issues that have formed the crux of social activism and public advocacy in Malaysia over the years.

**2.2 Social Network Analysis Overview**

Efforts to reform government are often dependent on a small group of actors, ranging from civil society organizations (CSOs), professional associations, media, government institutions, and international donor agencies. While each organization in a community of actors may have their own goals and activities aimed at government reform, in order to enact meaningful change organizations should work together cooperatively. Social network analysis provides a research perspective and methodology by which the structure of a particular environment can be assessed, thereby assisting in determining the state of cooperation among organizations dedicated to government reform issues in Malaysia.

Social network analysis (SNA) provides both a theoretical and methodological perspective for examining complex social structures and their activities. A social network is a group of actors (individuals, groups, or organizations) that are connected by some type of relationship (e.g., personal, professional, resource-based, advice-based). A SNA approach to research examines both the content and pattern of relationships in order to identify the impact of these relationships on the functioning of individual actors and the entire network. SNA helps to visually map and quantitatively measure the structure of a network of actors to determine how relationships affect the ability of organizations and communities to be successful.

SNA can be used to study the structure of relationships in many contexts. However, frequent uses of SNA are to determine the individuals or organizations that play important roles in a defined community of actors, as well as to assess the changing structure and strength of a network over a period of time. SNA is thus a compelling research methodology to use in assessing the structure of relationships among Malaysian CSOs focused on government reform, and how, potentially, that network were to change over the course of time or with the influence of new interventions.

**2.3 Social Network Survey Questions**

A social network is made up of individual actors or “nodes” that are tied together by certain kinds of relationships. SNA helps to identify the structure of a network of actors, the quality of relationships in it, identify gaps in relationships, and find those organizations that are best positioned within the network to cooperate and serve as an advocate on behalf of the network.

To identify the structure of relationships among actors within the Malaysian government reform sector, a series of network questions were posed to prominent individuals representing organizations working on issues pertaining to government reform in Malaysia. First, participants were asked a series of questions about their organization, including its age, headquarter location, number of staff, and primary issues of focus.

Then, participants were presented with a roster of organizations believed to be dedicated to the advancement of government reform in Malaysia (the roster and final sample to be described in the next section). The network data used to analyze interaction and relationship quality were acquired through use of a single-name generating question. The name-generating question was modeled after the National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) General Social Survey—a commonly used question in network survey design. Participants were asked to review the roster, and then identify the organizations on that list that their organization had interacted with in the last six months.

Finally, participants were asked a series of questions about the nature of their relationships with the organizations they identified in the single-name generating question. Questions included those designed to assess the overall effectiveness of the identified organizational contacts, how much they cooperated with and trusted each identified contact, and the overall shared goals and values with each contact. Finally, participants were asked to name any organizations on the roster with which they had ceased a relationship, and any organizations they viewed as competitors. The full survey is included in Appendix B.


## 2.4 Description of Sample

In the initial stage of the research (November 2018), there were as many as 500 self-proclaimed civil society organizations in Malaysia. In order to scale down and select only actors who advocated for government reforms, IMAN conducted initial background checks on almost 140 CSOs/NGOs and individuals working in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. Following discussions with Dr. Erich Sommerfeldt about the study and upon finalizing the questionnaire, IMAN tested the questionnaire on 10 CSOs using a Key Informant Interviews (KII) method in order to measure the adequacy of the survey and list of selected CSOs. Each KII was conducted face-to-face and lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. These KIIs allowed the researchers to refine the list to 125 groups and individuals, with 70% of them operating within the Klang Valley while the remaining 30% were based in other parts of the country. The questionnaires and interview kits were finalized in December 2018 and fieldwork began in January 2019.

The full list of organizations is included in Appendix A. Of the 125 organizations on the roster, 90 participated in the interview survey, for a response rate of 72%—meeting minimum expected participation rates for network research.

The sample included 64 civil society organizations, seven government organizations, four individual actors, four international organizations, four research/academic institutions, three non-governmental organizations, one activist group, and one donor organization. Participants were further asked to name where their organization was headquartered. Thirty organizations named Kuala Lumpur, seven named Sarawak, two named Johor, 24 named Selangor, 10 named Sabah, four from Penang, two from Kelantan, one from Perak, and nine organizations were located in more than one state. Participants stated that the number of staff members ranged from zero (sometimes meaning volunteer-operated) to 100, with an average of 16.56 staff members per organization.






Participants were also asked to name the primary and secondary issues they work on related to government reform. As can be seen in the chart above, 42 organizations worked on issues related to indigenous person and minority reform, followed by 31 working on issues pertaining to institutional reforms.

### SECTION 3. RESULTS OF NETWORK ANALYSIS

#### 3.1 Network Description

Each participant was asked to examine the provided roster of organizations and identify any organizations on that list with which they had interacted in the last six months. Responses ranged from one to 16 relationships, with an average of 6.84 relationships per organization. The network graph results of this interaction question can be seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Interaction network sized by degree centrality<sup>1</sup>



The above figure represents the current interaction network of Malaysian government reform organizations, with network pendants (organizations with only one tie) removed. In sum, there are 519 ties between the 125 nodes in the network. This makes for an overall network density of 0.06 percent. “Network density” describes the potential connections in a network that are actual connections. A “potential connection” is a connection that could potentially exist between two actors—regardless of whether or not that connection actually exists. An “actual connection” is a tie or relationship that actually exists. In this network of organizations, there is a potential for 7,750 interactions, but the network has only 519 ties. A six percent relationship density is somewhat low for a network of this size—a 10 to 15 percent density is more typical for a civil society network of this size. As network density is a metric of a social system transitioning to order, increasing the density of ties among these organizations would help to build the overall efficacy of the network.

### 3.2 Network Importance and Engagement: Degree Centrality

Analysis of degree centrality provides the most basic form of insight into prestigious and influential organizations in a network. In graph theory and network analysis, indicators of centrality identify the most important nodes or actors in a network—in this case, Malaysian government reform actors. Degree centrality is defined as the number of links incoming and outgoing from a node (i.e., the number of ties

<sup>1</sup> As the graphs are quite complex and difficult to read on a small scale, enlarged versions of each network figure are included in Appendix C.

that a node has). For directed graphs such as those used in this study, usually two separate measures of degree centrality are employed: *in-degree*, the count of the number of ties directed to the node; and *out-degree*, is the number of ties that the node directs to others. In-degree is often thought of a form of popularity, prestige or influence, and out-degree as gregariousness or propensity to engage others. Table 2 lists the in-degree scores of the top 10 organizations, as well as their accompanying out-degree scores.

**Table 2. Top organizations by centrality**

<b>Name</b>	<b>In-Degree (Rank)</b>	<b>Out- Degree</b>
Bersih 2.0	31 (1)	5
Bar Council Malaysia (BCM)	21 (2)	6
Sisters In Islam (SIS)	18 (3)	4
Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)	18 (3)	10
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM)	18 (3)	10
Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia (IKRAM)	17 (4)	2
Coalition of Malaysian NGOs in the UPR Process	16 (5)	1
Tenaganita	14 (6)	5
Women’s Aid Organization (WAO)	13 (7)	10
All Women's Action Society (AWAM)	11 (8)	8
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)	11 (8)	3

As seen in Table 1, Bersih 2.0 has the highest in-degree score of any organization by far. The interaction data also thus provides compelling evidence that Bersih 2.0 is perceived to be the most important and prestigious organization in the network. Other organizations like Sisters in Islam and SUARAM have high in-degree scores as well. Interestingly, while Bersih 2.0 has a high in-degree score, it has a far lower out-degree score, meaning its engagement with other actors in the network is less than one might expect from an organization with such great perceived influence. In contrast, SUARAM, IKRAM, and WAO have far higher engagement with the network, suggesting they have a greater degree of cooperation with other organizations. One possibility for this is that Bersih 2.0 is a coalition of multiple organizations, all of whom are independently involved in their various causes. Open and ongoing communication amongst the over 90 organizations are a constant which is why there is a possible lack of external engagements.

### 3.2.1 Hidden Network Structures: Betweenness Centrality

Analysis of betweenness centrality scores helps to reveal the hidden structures of a network of actors. betweenness centrality may be useful to report when the goal of the research is to uncover important gatekeepers, hubs for information, or to discover who connects different parts of a network. Betweenness centrality helps to gauge the extent to which an organization serves as a broker of information and resources in a network. Finally, betweenness centrality scores help to reveal if organizations help to connect different parts of a network and are therefore valuable communication partners.

Table 3. Top organizations by betweenness centrality


Name	Normalized betweenness (Rank)
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM)	10.73 (1)
Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF)	9.42 (2)
Women’s Aid Organization (WAO)	7.73 (3)
Bersih 2.0	6.99 (4)
Amnesty International Malaysia	6.98 (5)
Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)	6.71 (6)
Rise of Sarawak Efforts (ROSE)	5.68 (7)
Bar Council Malaysia (BCM)	4.65 (8)
Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia (ISIS)	4.13 (9)
Tenaganita	3.88 (10)

Assessments of betweenness centrality help to surmise how resources such as information flow through a network, and help to reveal organizations that have the capability to strategically broker or control the resource flow of the network. SUHAKAM, IRF, WAO, and Bersih 2.0 are high in betweenness centrality in this network, meaning they are in the best position within the network to control or broker information and resources to disparate parts of the network. They are also in the best position to reach out to disparate parts of the network, potentially bringing them close to others. However, the network centralization index is low at 9.54%, meaning no one organization exerts an undue amount of influence in the network as currently constructed. While Bersih 2.0, SUARAM, and SUHAKAM are repeatedly in top measures of influence, they do not necessarily direct the course of action within the network.

### 3.2.2 Hidden Network Structures: Core/Periphery Analysis

Core/Periphery analysis of network data seeks to identify a set of actors who have high density of ties among themselves (the core) by sharing many ties in common, and another set of actors who have very low density of ties among themselves (the periphery) by having fewer ties in common. Actors in the core are able to better coordinate their actions; those in the periphery are less likely to do so. An actor belongs to a core if and only if it is sufficiently well-connected both to other actors in the core, as well as to peripheral actors. A core structure in a network is thus densely connected but also tends to be comprised by the actors most “central” to the network. As a consequence, actors in the core are at a structural advantage in exchange relations with actors in the periphery. The figure below represents the results of the core/periphery analysis.

Figure 2. Core/periphery analysis of Malaysian government reform organizations



The above figure shows the “core” organizations in pink, and the “periphery” organizations in blue. The core/periphery analysis, which only considers structural position in the network, suggests that of the 125 identified organizations on the roster, 30 of them can be identified as the “core” of the Malaysian government reform effort<sup>2</sup>, and the remainder in the “periphery.” It is important to note that core/periphery analysis cannot consider individual organizational efficacy. It only assesses the core and periphery of the network as derived from the structure of the reported network data. Still, the method provides a reliable assessment of those actors central to a community of actors and those who are perhaps less central. It also provides insight into which actors could readily be enlisted into a collective action activity, and those organizations that might require more engagement before collective activity or collaboration could be undertaken.


### 3.3 Shared Issue Interests

As mentioned earlier, each participant was asked to name the top two issues of government reform on which their organization focused. To determine if there are any connections between organizations and issues, a correlation analysis of shared issue interests finds that IMPR and SCT are moderately correlated ( $r = .33$ ), CSR and LR are moderately correlated ( $r = .29$ )—meaning that these issue combinations are more likely than most to be prioritized together. The remaining issues have low or non-existent

<sup>2</sup> The core organizations are, in alphabetical order: AIM, ALIRAN, AWAM, AZMI SHAROM, BCM, BERSIH 2.0, BRIMAS, COAC, COMANGO, DNC, EMPOWER, IKRAM, IRF, JERIT, JFS, JKOASM, KMU, MCCHR, NSI, PACOSTRUST, ROSE, SAWO, SCRIPS, SIS, SITI KASIM, SM, SWWS, TENAGANITA, WAO.

correlations. To further illustrate the connection between issues, the figure below presents a one-mode presentation of the two-mode actor-to-issue network.

Figure 3. Shared issues by organizations




By examining patterns of which actors are connected (or not) to which issues, it is possible to infer an underlying pattern of social ties, factions, and groupings among the actors. The closer the actors appear together on the above graph, the more similar they are to the other actors in terms of their shared issue interests. The figure above thus provides diagnostic insight as to the positioning of issues within Malaysian government reform space. For example, Bersih 2.0 is more similar to ENGAGE and TAF in terms of issue focus, and less similar to TENAGANITA, which is on the other side of the graph. The graph thus provides direction as to which organizations might more readily collaborate together, as they share similar issue positions and focus.

### 3.4 Donor Positions

Donors often play a crucial role in establishing and maintaining a robust civil society sector. To determine the structural position and relative influence of donor organizations in Malaysian Government reform, the interview participants were asked to name any donor organizations from which they had received funding or support. Surprisingly, many participants were comfortable revealing their donor sources, and more than 130 individual donor actors were identified—most donors were named only once or twice. Indeed, the only supposed “donors” mentioned with any degree of frequency were “individuals” and “government.”

Figure 4. Two-mode actor-donor relations



The figure above shows the “main component” of the actor-donor two-mode network—meaning that pendants and one-to-one relationships in the network have been removed. As can be seen, the most common and structurally significant source of donor funding in the Malaysian government reform space are individual donors and government grants/assistance. While some embassies and international donors like USAID and UNDP are present in the space, they do not occupy structurally significant or advantageous positions within the network. This limits such actors’ ability to direct the course of collective action within the network, and to ensure the network’s long-term sustainability. This

### 3.4 Communication Importance

To further discern those organizations that are perceived to be the most integral to the government reform community in Malaysia, a communication importance question was employed. The question “On a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important), rate the value of your organization’s communication relationship with each organization listed below,” was used to assess what actors are thought to be the most important to maintain a relationship with based on the evaluations of the other members of the community. The mean response for this question was quite high ( $M = 4.64$ ), meaning most participants highly valued their communication relationship with all of their contacts. The answers to this question were also used to create the network of relations based on organizational importance.

The results for organizational communication importance were calculated using what is called *weighted in-degree centrality*. Weighted in-degree centrality in this case represents the total score achieved by each organization, obtained by adding together all other respondents’ rankings of that organization. Weighted degree centrality represents the collective opinion of all other actors in a network regarding each node’s characteristics. As seen in the results presented in Table 4, Bersih 2.0 emerged as the most important actor among the government reform community in Malaysia based on the evaluations of communication

importance. Other CSOs like Bar Council Malaysia, and Sisters in Islam were also ranked highly, though Bersih 2.0 was by far the highest ranked organization.

Table 4. Top 10 organizations by perceived relationship communication importance

Name	Weighted In-Degree (Rank)
Bersih 2.0	119 (1)
Bar Council Malaysia (BCM)	91 (2)
Sisters In Islam (SIS)	80 (3)
Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)	75 (4)
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM)	71 (5)
Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia (IKRAM)	64 (6)
Tenaganita	61 (7)
Coalition of Malaysian NGOs in the UPR Process (COMANGO)	59 (8)
Women's Aid Organization (WAO)	57 (9)
All Women's Action Society (AWAM)	47 (10)
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)	47 (10)

It is important to note that the results of the communication importance question above do not necessarily represent the most important or engaged organizations in government reform in terms of activities or outcomes. Instead, the results indicate those organizations with which the government reform community felt it was important to maintain relationships. Therefore, the results of the question indicate the perceptions of the organizations themselves on those organizations they perceive to be important partners. Many of the organizations presented here, although not necessarily uniform in their relationship with the previous Barisan Nasional government and current Pakatan Harapan Government, have many shared values and causes. Most began as political movements and registered as companies as ways to evade interrogation from authorities (which in many cases were not successful) and have become icons for being direct, vocal and critical of issues that they represent. Their rich history with the state and constant appearance in the media, both local and international, make them appealing allies for chasing government reforms.

### 3.4 Most Influential on Government Reform

Participants were also asked to rank, for each organization they identified as a contact, on a scale of 1 (very little influence) to 5 (great influence), the perceived influence that particular actor has on government reform. The mean response for this question was also high ( $M = 4.04$ ), suggesting that most participants believe that their contacts exert a notable degree of influence over government reform. The results for influence on government reform were also calculated using weighted in-degree centrality.



Table 5. Top 10 organizations by perceived influence actors have on government reform

Name	Weighted In-Degree (Rank)
Bersih 2.0	127 (1)
Bar Council Malaysia (BCM)	89 (2)
Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM)	70 (3)
Sisters in Islam (SIS)	67 (4)
Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)	67 (4)
Christian Federation Malaysia (CFM)	61 (5)
Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia (IKRAM)	61 (5)
Women's Aid Organization (WAO)	54 (6)
Tenaganita	52 (7)
Angkata Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM)	47 (8)
All Women's Action Society (AWAM)	40 (9)
Persatuan Sukarelawan Muslim Sandakan (MUST)	40 (9)
Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4Center)	38 (10)

Table 5 reports the weighted in-degree centrality of the top 10 organizations by their perceived influence on government reform. As with the communication importance question, Bersih 2.0 emerged as the most influential organization by far. Other organizations such as AWAM, MUST, and the C4 Center were also included in this top 10 list, while others like COMANGO were not included in this list, despite having high interaction centrality scores and a high ranking for communication importance. As this finding illustrates, a central position by degree centrality is not always equivalent to perceived effectiveness or efficacy. Organizations may interact with many partners due to history, shared interests, or other reasons, but not perceive them to be particularly efficacious in influencing change.

Figure 5. Influence over government reform “great influence”



The figure above shows the relationships between organizations that were ranked as “5,” meaning the organization was perceived to have “great influence” over Malaysian government reform. Only 105 of the original 519 ties are evident in this graph, suggesting that 20% of the relational observations about influence are at the highest level. Unsurprisingly, Bersih 2.0, SUKAHAM and BCM hold the most ties or observations for having “great influence.” These three organizations come across especially so due to their member’s ability to engage with the law effectively. The members of Bersih 2.0, SUKAHAM and BCM are mostly lawyers or possess some type of legal background, and hold clout in various forms of legal practices. They are especially experienced as human rights lawyers and even as individuals have had a history of campaigning and demanding for reforms. These three organizations are also known for being very organized with their activities, most of which are large scale, which further adds to their recognition.

An additional means of assessing perceived influence in the government reform space was accomplished by asking participants to name the top 5 most influential actors in the space, regardless of whether their organization had interacted with them or not. By far, Bersih 2.0 was named at the most influential (n = 51), followed by SUKAHAM (n = 28), Bar Council Malaysia (n = 28), SUARAM (n = 15), and COMANGO (n = 15).

### 3.5 Trust and Information Exchange

Participants were asked to rank each of their identified organizations, on a scale of 1 to 5, the degree to which they “trust” the organization, the extent to which they “rely” on the organization, the extent to which they “receive valuable information” from that organization, and the extent to which they “collaborate” with each organization. The mean responses for trust (M = 4.36) and information exchange (M = 4.76) were quite high, while the scores for collaboration (M = 3.28) and reliance (M = 3.15) were noticeably lower. This suggests a network largely comprised by positive affinity rather than actual engagement.

Figure 6. High collaboration network





Figure 4 represents the ties between organizations that ranked as 5 for collaboration—meaning such ties are characterized by a high degree of collaboration. While the mean for collaboration was moderate, 196 ties, or 37% of the total relationships among Malaysian government reform organizations are highly collaborative. Also, as can be seen in the figure, much of the collaboration is occurring among or with organizations part of the “core” of this network—represented in pink. CSOs in Malaysia are constantly looking for allies, especially due to the lack government initiatives and assistance during the previous administration. But while there is always a desire to work together, most of the work conducted are issue-based and tend to attract allies with similar interest, hence a moderate amount of participation per issue. More controversial ones, particularly on women's and LGBT rights perhaps attract the least number of alliances.

### 3.6 Competition

In civil society networks, there is often a limited pool of resources from which actors can draw. Donors typically focus on a select range of issues, meaning that organizations dedicated to resolving certain issues may compete with one another—scarce resources can sometimes lead to perceived competition among organizations. Therefore, participants were asked to name those organizations whom they believed to be a competitor of their own for funding and program support.

Figure 7. Competition for funding and program support network



The above network represents the ties among groups who believe the other organizations to be competition for funding. The nodes are sized by in-degree centrality, meaning that SIS, AWAM, and EMPOWER are most frequently cited as competitors for similar pots of money for programming. Funding for CSOs in general are program-centric. A good example of this are the three organizations mentioned, SIS, AWAM and EMPOWER, all of whom have worked and are currently working on women’s issues and the development, a major interest to many foreign funders. This perhaps accounts for the perceived competition among these groups.

### 3.7 Obstacles to Collaboration

While collaborations may be undertaken to help solve common concerns, there are often perceived barriers or obstacles to enacting such collaborations, Thus, the final part of the network survey asked each

actor to rank on a scale of 1 (not a barrier at all) to 5 (a significant barrier) potential obstacles to collaboration.

Table 6. Perceived barriers to collaboration

Item	Mean
1. Significant differences between operating systems of potential partners	2.42
2. Lack of resources, financial and staff, needed to maintain collaborations	3.63
3. Complexity or difficulty of maintaining collaborative relationships	3.05
4. Fear that collaborative efforts might fail	2.53
5. Desire to do things independently	2.44
6. Lack of felt need to collaborate	2.73
7. Negative history between potential partners	2.05
8. Lack of perceived joint benefits of collaboration	2.78
9. Fear that collaboration with others could impact our public image	2.35
10. Perceived competition for current or future funding	1.55

The mean results of these questions show that most organizations do not perceive there to be significant obstacles to collaboration with other actors in the network. The item which received the highest mean score (lack of resources) suggests that actors in the network view financial and staff resources as the highest potential barrier to collaboration. Interestingly, competition for funding received the lowest score of the items, suggesting that funding is not perceived to be a significant source of tension among actor in the network. To discern which organizations perceived there to be high barriers or obstacles or overcome in collaborating with others, the mean score across the 10 items above were calculated. The top five organizations for perceived barriers included CETDEM (M = 3.80), TAF (M = 3.80), JEWEL (M = 4.0), AIM (M = 3.80), and KMU (M = 4.1). The last two organizations' stance on barriers is somewhat surprising given their membership in the core of the network.

## SECTION 4. RESULTS OF QUALITATIVE QUESTIONS

The final part of the survey included qualitative questions designed to provide insight on the state of collaboration among actors in the network. Participants were asked whether they perceived the relationship among the actors listed on the roster to be generally harmonious or conflictive and whether those actors would be willing to help or partner with their respective organizations if need be. For both questions, participants were asked to state the reasons for their answers. Finally, participants were asked whether they regarded any political, geographical, religious or financial issues to be impediments that prevent them from building relationships beyond their existing partnerships.

Overall, participants deemed relationships between civil society actors in Malaysia to be harmonious instead of conflictive as many CSOs have overlapping agenda and objectives. CSOs tend to work with like-minded organizations and conflicts are generally minimized because interaction with different groups are limited. Johor Women's League (JEWEL) observed that while CSOs are seen to disagree in public, negotiations do take place behind the scenes and this facilitates cooperation between them.

Interestingly, seven out of 10 participants interviewed in Sabah posited that they considered relationships amongst CSOs to be conflictive. Reasons cited include CSOs having contrasting aims and agendas, divergent political views and operating systems, in addition to being politically and financially opportunistic.

A whopping 88% of the participants agreed that other civil society actors would be willing to partner with them if the need should arise. Apart from availability in funding, commonalities in agenda and objectives are substantial pull factors which help facilitate cooperation between actors. Groups like the Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF), *Pusat Latihan dan Dakwah Orang Asli* (PULDOA) and JEWEL, alongside other prominent organizations such as Penang Institute (PI) and *Suara Rakyat Malaysia* (SUARAM) state that organizational influence and popularity also plays a significant role in determining possible collaborative relationships. In many cases, partnerships with well-known organizations are used as a strategic tool to put the lesser-known actor in the spotlight.

The remaining 12% of participants were mainly made up of groups working on LGBT rights and advocacy including Justice for Sisters (JFS), *Seksualiti Merdeka* (SM) and PT Foundation (PTF). These groups said that collaboration with other civil society actors would be unlikely due to their organizational aims and nature of work. Similarly, the Malaysian Social Research Institute (MSRI) stated that domestic civil society organizations mainly focus on issues related to local citizens. This, therefore, makes it difficult for MSRI to find partners and adequate funding for their programs which primarily deals with problems affecting non-Malaysians.

Out of the 90 participants interviewed, less than half responded that they did not consider politics, geography, religion or finances as barriers to collaboration at all with other government reform actors, while 32% of the respondents specified financial constraints as a major obstacle. Monetary constraints made it difficult for actors to carry out their mandates, besides organizing relevant programs and activities. Participants also linked insufficient finances to geographical limitations in terms of forming and sustaining partnerships with other civil society actors, especially those located outside their immediate geographical location, such as Sabah and Sarawak. Other actors with loftier goals such as *Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor* (EMPOWER) stated that limited financial resources restricted their ability to network with regional and international peers.

Twenty-one participants specified that the political orientation of potential partners could influence their decision for project collaboration. If the political inclinations of the potential partner is deemed too dissimilar from their own, then collaborative efforts would be highly unlikely. However, organizations such as the North South Initiative (NSI) and the Kelantan Chinese Peranakan Association (KCPA) pointed out that they were still open to working with actors who are politically divergent from them depending on the objectives of partnerships and for other practical reasons such as funding.

Participants who highlighted religious issues as a barrier to collaboration are either predominantly religious or organizations that deal with LGBT issues. Religious organizations such as the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST) and PULDOA, acknowledge that it is vital for them to accommodate all groups, regardless of religious belief. At the same time, they recognize that it would be tricky for them to collaborate with actors who hold incompatible worldviews with their organization. JFS and SM view aversion to their organizations as a form of reprisal because they advocate LGBT rights and work closely with the LGBT community. Some actors believe that

by associating with these groups, it would negatively impact their public image and possibly garner backlash from society, thus avoiding collaboration altogether.

## SECTION 5. Conclusion, recommendations, lessons learned

### 5. 1 Conclusions and Recommendations

#### **Positive Affinity, Low Density, and Opportunities for Donors**

Throughout fieldwork, many participants revealed their discomfort in referring to others on the roster as “competitors.” It is apparent from the data that the CSO landscape is a rather inclusive one, in which everyone working on reforms are viewed as valuable and thus a category like “competitors” is felt as discrediting other CSOs’ influence. High levels of trust and information exchange exist among the actors. This creates an environment ripe for collaboration among members of the network. Greater strategic positioning of donors within the network and support of cooperative activities could leverage the high levels of affinity and catalyze collaborations.

Larger civil society networks such as that examined herein tend to have lower relationship density than smaller networks. However, at 6%, the density is still somewhat lower than would be expected. Indeed, the current low density of the network should be an issue of primary concern moving forward. The low density suggests this is a network in transition—perhaps interactions among these groups have declined after the recent elections. Lower density could also mean this is a nascent civil society sector in need of nurturing and maturation. Increased density is a sign of a social system moving towards order and greater efficacy. Fostering relationships and striving towards greater relational density could help to mature the network.

One of the major questions raised pertaining to the funding of CSOs and individuals in the reforms movement are how much donors actually drive the work that they do? Most sources of funding that these actors have cited were mainly in the form of member fees and donations, with other stating smaller government grants as well. For a number of more prominent actors, many of their members were also lawyers who offered their services pro bono. Thus, while numerous donors have worked with select CSOs in Malaysia, the work accomplished by Malaysian government reform actors has been primarily accomplished without the assistance of centrally structured donor organizations connecting multiple organizations. On the one hand, this speaks to the strength of coalition organizations like Bersih and COMANGO; on the other, it points out a vacancy that exists in the network which a major donor could fill.

Perhaps one incidental upside of the lack of donors strategically positioned in the space is that positive affinity permeates the relationship network. Typically, greater reliance on donor organizations results in enhanced competition among civil society actors for resources. Central or core organizations often have connections to donor organizations that facilitate their connections to others, resulting in core organizations being perceived as more competitive than the periphery. Such is not the case in this network, where perceived competition is low almost unanimously throughout the network.

#### **Longevity and Centralization**

One important key finding is how longevity matters, where we see a comparison between old and new organizations. Better-established and older organizations tended to have more prominence and clout within the network. This would have stemmed from their constant interactions with the federal government in various forms, allowing for their activities and motivations to gain more traction with the general public. That being said, other than Bersih 2.0, SUHAKAM and the Bar Council of Malaysia, other peripheral CSOs and individuals do not boast as organized a structure of networks. Although in solidarity with each other, those pushing for reforms participate in each other's activities casually and provide support based on mutual trust. In essence, there are no on-the-ground connections and many of these actors are a loose connection of networks, which is difficult to measure in quantitative variables.

Some recommendations from the data indicate a need for better distribution of visibility for CSOs working on reforms in Malaysia instead of only highlighting the work of powerhouses such as Bersih. While recognizable and influential organizations like Bersih should be supported as "flagship" organizations for government reform, opportunities exist to elevate the profile of other organizations, particularly those strategically situated within the network's "core." As an extension to that, CSOs working on similar reforms (especially those outside the Klang Valley) should explore ways to organize themselves into stronger coalitions and partnerships to increase their effectiveness and presence. The network graph on issue similarity (Figure 3) provides insight into how collaborations among similar issue-interested organizations might be enacted.

### **Leveraging Betweenness Centrality, Expanding the Core**

Betweenness centrality considers the extent to which an actor is between all other actors in a network. If an actor is between two other actors then it follows that there is not a connection between other nodes on the path connecting them. Betweenness centrality also reflects the ability of a node to act as a broker for another, and can indicate the level of control certain nodes have over the entire network. While network centralization scores do not suggest an undue level of influence exerted by any small group of organizations in this network, nonetheless there are several groups that are well-positioned to serve as information brokers and facilitators of cooperation. Table 3 shows those actors highest in betweenness centrality. These groups are strategically best positioned to reach disparate parts of the network. Thus, they have the capacity, should they choose to exert it, to bring together parts of the network in greater collaboration. Efforts at enhancing network collaboration, or spreading information throughout the network to form cohesive goals, could start by targeting these groups. Coordinating meaningful strategic interventions with dozens of actors is often difficult. Moreover, local partners can sometimes meet large-scale donor interventions with resistance. Instead, enlisting the support and activity of a select group of well-positioned, trusted, actors is a more resource-efficient and bottom-up approach to engaging the network.

## **5. 2 Lessons learned**

One of the major lessons learned from this study was that the eight categories of government reform sectors were not exhaustive. Participants pointed out some missing categories that they felt were important in the reforms movement in Malaysia, specifically Environment and Climate Change Reforms, Women's Rights and Employment, Migration and Migrant Reforms and Sustainable Development Reforms. Another major issue raised was that the study was too Klang Valley-centric and could have been more inclusive of organizations and individuals in other states. A majority of organizations and individuals



tend to operate within the Klang Valley for a number of reasons; for viability and proximity to the center of power, to better fund themselves and for prompt mobilization. Many also depend on the media (most of whom also operate within the Klang Valley) to help boost their national presence. However many of those who push for reforms outside of the urban center tend to focus less of creating a presence through the media or online. Many also began as NGOs eager to help on community development and resilience programs and embark on reforms work much later in their careers. With more time and effort, seeking out other CSOs and individuals in the periphery would have enriched the data further.

These issues are a reflection of shortcomings that were apparent from the initial stages of the study and could have been avoided with better planning. Unfortunately, the study was commissioned to be completed within a short timeframe, which required the planning stages to be carried out in a hurried manner. Prior to finalizing the list of reforms and roster of organizations shortlisted to participate, the research team conducted one round of Key Informant Interviews (KII) with 10 CSOs to measure if the survey questionnaire was relevant and adequate to obtain the desired data. In hindsight, multiple rounds of KII with a larger number of CSOs would have better served the overall objectives of the study. It would have allowed the team to grasp a stronger understanding of the range of reforms being carried out in Malaysia and to include these in the subsequent questionnaire.

Similarly, it became apparent as the study progressed that some of the survey questions were irrelevant or inappropriate to the participating organizations. For example, some of the CSOs interviewed said they could not relate to certain questions and suggested that the study was being pursued without a thorough understanding of the CSO landscape in Malaysia. Others were not comfortable in sharing information about other CSOs or regarding them as “competitors” and were unwilling to respond when asked to rate the effectiveness of fellow activists/CSOs working on reforms.

## APPENDIX A. Roster of Malaysian Government Reform Actors

<u>List of CSOs - by state</u>		
KLANG VALLEY		
ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
1	All Women's Action Society	AWAM
2	Allied Coordinating Committee of Islamic NGOs /Gabungan Pertubuhan Islam Bukan Kerajaan	ACCIN
3	Ampo- Asosasyon ng mga Makabayang Manggagawang Pilipino Overseas- Malaysia	AMMPO
4	Amnesty International Malaysia	AIM
5	Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia	ABIM
6	ASEAN Intergovernmental Human Rights Mechanism	ASEANIHRM
7	Asia Europe Institute – University Malaya	AEI UM
8	Asian-Pacific Resources and Research Center for Women (ARROW)	ARROW
9	Association of Women Lawyers	AWL
10	Azmi Sharom (UM)	AZMI_SHAROM
11	Bar Council Malaysia	BCM
12	BEBAS	BEBAS
13	Bersih 2.0	BERSIH 2.0
14	Building and Wood Worker's International, Asia-Pacific (BWI)	BWI
15	Center for Governance and Political Studies	Cent-GPS
16	Center for Orang Asli Concerns	COAC
17	Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism	C4 Center
18	Centre for Environment, Technology & Development, Malaysia	CETDEM
19	Christian Federation Malaysia	CFM
20	Coalition of Malaysian NGOs in the UPR Process	COMANGO
21	Education and Research Association for Consumers (ERA Consumer)	ERA CONSUMER
22	Federation of Malaysian Consumer Associations (FOMCA)	FOMCA
23	G25	G25
24	General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT)	GEFONT
25	Global Peace Foundation	GPF
26	Health Equity Initiatives (HEI)	HEI

27	IndustriALL	IALL
28	Institut Darul Ehsan (IDE)	IDE
29	Institut Wanita Berdaya (IWB)	IWB
30	Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS)	IDEAS
31	Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA – UKM)	KITA UKM
32	Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia	ISIS
33	International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies Malaysia (IAIS)	IAIS
34	International Institute of Islamic Civilisation & Malay World (ISTAC)	ISTAC
35	INVOKE	INVOKE
36	Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF)	IRF
37	JERIT - Jaringan Rakyat Tertindas - Coalition of the Oppressed People	JERIT
38	Justice For Sisters (JFS)	JFS
39	Kairos Dialogue Network	KAIROS
40	Khazanah Research Institute (KRI)	KRI
41	Komuniti Muslim Universal	KMU
42	KUASA	KUASA
43	Lawyers for Liberty (LFL)	LFL
44	Majlis Belia Malaysia (MBM)	MBM
45	Majlis Perundingan Pertubuhan Islam Malaysia (MAPIM)	MAPIM
46	Majlis Tindak Ekonomi Melayu (MTEM) Bumiputera Economic Action Council	MTEM
47	Malaysia Hindu Sangam (MHS)	MHS
48	Malaysia Muda	MM
49	Malaysian Against Death Penalty and Torture (MADPET)	MADPET
50	Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism and Human Rights (MCCHR)	MCCHR
51	Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association (MACMA)	MACMA
52	Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST)	MCCBCHST
53	Malaysian Environment NGO (MENGO)	MENGO
54	Malaysian Social Research Institute	MSRI
55	Malaysian Social Science Association (MSSA)	MSSA
56	Malaysian Trade Unions Congress	MTUC
57	Maqasid Institute Malaysia	MIM
58	Mercy Malaysia (MERCY)	MERCY

59	Merdeka Center	MERDEKA
60	MUAFAKAT	MUAFAKAT
61	Multaqa Asatizah & Du'at (MURSHID)	MURSHID
62	National Human Rights Society - Persatuan Kebangsaan Hak Asasi Manusia HAKAM	HAKAM
63	National Union for Bank Employees	NUBE
64	North South Initiative (NSI)	NSI
65	Oriental Hearts and Minds Study Institute (OHMSI)	OHMSI
66	Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor	EMPOWER
67	Persatuan Ulama Malaysia	PUM
68	Pertubuhan Himpunan Lepasn Institusi Pendidikan Malaysia	HALUAN
69	Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia (IKRAM)	IKRAM
70	Petubuhan Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah	ASWAJA
71	PT FOUNDATION	PTF
72	Seksualiti Merdeka	SM
73	Shad Saleem Faruqi (UiTM)	SS_FARUQI
74	Sisters In Islam (SIS)	SIS
75	Siti Kassim	S_KASSIM
76	Solidaritas Jejaring Pekerja Indonesia di Malaysia (SERANTAU)	SERANTAU
77	Southeast Asia Center for E-Media (SEACeM)	SEACEM
78	Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism	SEARCCT
79	Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM)	SUARAM
80	Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia (SUHAKAM)	SUHAKAM
81	Tajuddin Rosli (UiTM)	TAJUDDIN_ROSLI
82	Tenaganita	TENAGANITA
83	Terence Gomez	TERENCE_GOMEZ
84	The Asia Foundation (TAF)	TAF
85	The Institute of Journalists Malaysia	TIJM
86	Transparency International (TIM) Malaysia	TIM
87	Women's Aid Organization	WAO
88	World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)	WAMY
89	World Wide Fund for Nature Malaysia	WWF
90	Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia	YADIM

ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
91	Kelantan Chinese Peranakan Association	KCPA
92	Persatuan Wanita Kelantan Malaysia	PEWATAN
93	Pusat dan Latihan Dakwah Orang Asli	PULDOA
<b>JOHOR</b>		
ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
94	Engage	ENGAGE
95	Johor Women's League / Pertubuhan Pergerakan Wanita Johor	JEWEL
<b>PERAK</b>		
ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
96	Jaringan Kampung Orang Asli Semenanjung Malaysia	JKOASM
<b>PENANG</b>		
ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
97	Aliran Kesedaran Negara	ALIRAN
98	Consumers' Association of Penang	CAP
99	Penang Institute	PI
100	Pesticide Action Network Asia And The Pacific	PAN AP
101	Thompson Reuters Foundation	TRF
<b>SABAH</b>		
ID	Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals	Acronym
102	Angkatan Gabungan Rakyat Asli Sabah	AGARAS
103	Borneo Komrad	BK
104	Eestern Sabah Security Command	ESSCOM
105	Gabungan NGO Negeri Sabah	GANNOS
106	Humana	HUMANA
107	Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia	JOAS
108	Kadazandusun Cultural Association	KDCA
109	Pangrok Sulap	PS
110	Partners of Community Organisations	PACOS Trust
111	Persatuan Sukarelawan Muslim Sandakan	MUST

<b>112</b>	Pertubuhan Bela Batu Sapi	PEMBELA
<b>113</b>	Pusat Hak Asasi & Keselamatan Komuniti Sabah	ASASI
<b>114</b>	Sabah Women's Action Resource Group	SAWO
<b>115</b>	Youth Prep Centre	YPC
<b>SARAWAK</b>		
<b>ID</b>	<b>Name of CSOs/NGOs/Associations/Institutions/Think Tanks/Individuals</b>	<b>Acronym</b>
<b>116</b>	Angkatan Zaman Mansang Sarawak	AZAM
<b>117</b>	Borneo Resources Institute Malaysia	BROMAS
<b>118</b>	Dayak National Congress	DNC
<b>119</b>	Dayak Think Tank Group	DTTG
<b>120</b>	Rise of Sarawak Efforts	ROSE
<b>121</b>	Sarawak Dayak Iban Association	SADIA
<b>122</b>	Sarawak for Sarawakians	S4S
<b>123</b>	Sarawak Women for Women Society	SWWS
<b>124</b>	Sinui Pai Nanek Sengik (New Light One Heart)	SPNS
<b>125</b>	Society for Rights of Indigenous Peoples of Sarawak	SCRIPS

## APPENDIX B. SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Name of Interviewer: \_\_\_\_\_

### SECTION A

**Name of Actor/Organization Interviewed:**

**ID Number of Actor/Organization Interviewed:**

**Introduction:** The purpose of this project is to highlight the efforts of local CSOs and the important work they do of pushing for reforms. The previous administration were less supportive in having these reforms presented and articulated for consideration. However, current ruling coalition has provided the opportunity for previously dormant reforms to be revived and pushed for. Thus, we at IMAN feel it is important to help provide a sense of camaraderie and solidarity amongst each organization and individual to help move these reforms along, by providing a network analysis of all the important actors involved. We also feel that by making clear the role each actor plays, redundancy and contradictions by way of strategy and processes can be greatly reduced.

As IMAN and its funders believe in practicing transparent and ethical research, the information gathered from these interviews will be compiled and after a roundtable involving the important stakeholders, will be made available publicly at the end of the study.

<p><b>1. What year was your organization founded?</b></p>	<p><b>2. How many staff work for your organization?</b></p>
<p><b>3. In what state is your organization headquartered? (Circle one)</b></p> <p>Sabah Sarawak Selangor Kuala_Lumpur  Kelantan Terengganu Penang Johor  Melacca Perlis Negeri_Sembilan  Perak Pahang Kedah</p> <p>Other, outside Malaysia (list):</p>	<p><b>4. In what states does your organization work? (circle all that apply)</b></p> <p>Sabah Sarawak Selangor Kuala_Lumpur  Kelantan Terengganu Penang Johor  Melacca Perlis Negeri_Sembilan  Perak Pahang Kedah</p>
<p><b>5. Organization Type (circle one)</b></p> <p>CSO International_Organization  Government Donor  Business Research/Academic  Activist Individual</p>	<p><b>6. Is your organization a member of any coalitions? (if so, list names)</b></p>
<p><b>7. We are interested in knowing about active donors helping in pushing reforms in Malaysia. Could you share with us some of the donors you've worked with?</b></p>	<p><b>8. From the list shown here, which would you say is the <u>first / second / third</u> most important issues for Malaysian government reform? (rank 1, 2, 3)</b></p> <p>Security ___ Media ___ Good Governance ___  Institutional Reforms ___ Reform of government linked companies ___  Civil service reforms ___ Indigenous persons and minority reform ___  Labor rights ___</p>
<p><b>9. Of the 8 issues listed here, what is the most important issue you work on related to Malaysian government reform? (show reference sheet with 8 listed reform issues)</b></p>	<p><b>10. Of the issues listed here, what is the second most important issue you work on related to Malaysian government reform, <u>if any?</u> (show reference sheet with 8 listed reform issues)</b></p>



**SECTION B Transition: We are now interested in learning about your relationship and actors with other organizations and individuals. Could you please take a few moments to look through this list before I continue?**

**ID Number of Actor Interviewed:**

**First Question: Looking back over the last six months, which of the actors on this list have you interacted with?  
(List no more than 20 ID numbers, collect follow up data on no more than the first 10)**

ID NUMBER	ACRONYM	Communication Importance & Influence			On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)					On a scale of 1 (not very similar) to 5 (very similar), how would you say this actor is similar to you/your organization.				
		Of the 8 issues listed here, what do you believe is this actor's most important issue of focus for Malaysian Government Reform? <sup>a</sup>	On a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important), rate the value of your communication relationship with this actor.	On a scale of 1 (very little influence) to 5 (great influence), rate the influence this actor has on government reform.	<i>This actor:</i> Collaborates with me/my org.	<i>This actor:</i> Provides me/my org. with important and accurate information	<i>Me/my org:</i> Relies on this actor.	<i>Me/my org:</i> Trusts this actor.	<i>This actor:</i> Is a competitor of me/my org.	Political agenda	Shared Values and beliefs	Social Interests and causes	Similar in terms of level of achievement and impact	Civil society activities/programs

<sup>a</sup> Security = SCT      Media = MD      Good Governance = GG      Institutional Reforms = IR      Reform of Government Linked Companies = GLC      Civil Service Reforms = CSR  
 Indigenous person and minority reform = IPMR      Labor Rights = LR

**Section C Transition: Thank you so much for allowing us to have a conversation on your contacts. We are also interested in organisations and individuals who are in direct competition with you(rs) as well as organizations and individuals you have ceased working with.**

SECTION C.1	
Competition and Ceased Relationships	
In the listed actors, which ones compete with you/your organization for funding and program support?  (List ID Number)	Please list all the actors that you have stopped working with in the last year.  (List ID Number)

**SECTION C.2**

**Regardless of whether you have interacted with them or not, which five actors do you believe to be the most influential in advocating for Malaysian government reform?**

1. \_\_\_\_\_
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_

## SECTION D

### BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION

**On a scale of 1 (no barrier at all) to 5 (a significant barrier), how would you rank each as a barrier to collaboration with other government reform actors?**

1. Significant differences between the operating systems of potential partners: \_\_\_\_
2. Lack of resources, financial and staff, needed maintain collaborative projects and relationships: \_\_\_\_
3. Complexity or difficulty of maintaining collaborative projects and relationships: \_\_\_\_
4. Fear that collaborative efforts might fail: \_\_\_\_
5. Desire to do things independently: \_\_\_\_
6. Lack of felt need to collaborate: \_\_\_\_
7. Negative history between potential partners: \_\_\_\_
8. Lack of perceived joint benefits of a collaboration: \_\_\_\_
9. Fear that collaboration with others could impact our public image: \_\_\_\_
10. Perceived competition for current or future funding: \_\_\_\_

**SECTION E**

**QUALITATIVE QUESTIONS**


**In your opinion, are the relationships among the actors on this list generally harmonious or conflictive? Why or why not?**

**Would you say that most of the other actors on this list are willing to help or partner with you/your organization should you need it? Why or why not?**


**Are there political, geographic, religious, or financial reasons that prevent you from building relationships beyond your existing partnerships?**

# APPENDIX C. NETWORK MAPS

**Interaction Network, sized by centrality**




## Core/Periphery




Nodes in pink represent those in the “core,” while those nodes in blue are in the “periphery” of the network.

## Shared Issues




## Two-mode actor-donor relations







# High collaboration relationships, by core/periphery



# Competition for funding, program support

